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THE LAW SCHOOL
Again with deep sorrow there must be recorded on this page the
death of a loyal and valued member of the faculty and staunch believer
in the future of the School. On July 3d, 1920, Professor John
Warren Edgerton died after a long illness from tuberculosis, at a
time when it was hoped that he was on the road to recovery. Since
1903 Professor Edgerton had devoted his energies to the upbuilding
of the Yale Law School, first as instructor, then as assistant professor,
and from 1913 as professor. For many years also he had served as
Secretary of the Faculty. His forceful and amiable personality en-
deared him to the students, and his long experience and thorough knowl-
edge of commercial law subjects made him a strong teacher, whose
place it will be most difficult to fill.
Another loss -that is very serious for the School is the retirement
of Professor Wurts. His health proved to be such last year that he
deems it unwise to risk another severe winter in the North. Having
completed twenty-five years of service at Yale, he has tendered his
resignation as an active member of the Faculty, and will hereafter hold
office as professor emeritus. No one could have served the School
with greater loyalty and devotion. In the hearts of the graduates he
has a place reserved for none other; no one could have received a
[56]
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greater testimonial of regard from the students than that offered him
at the smoker in his honor last spring.
Yet in spite of these losses, that come so soon after the death of
Professor Barbour, one cannot help but feel that the School has before
it a year of great development. A summer session was again held that
was even more successful than the first one a year ago. The enroll-
ment for the regular term is 179, the largest since the rule requiring
a college degree went into effect some ten years ago, and begins to
approach the numbers (including high-school graduates) registered
annually before that time. It is thirty per cent larger than last year,
and the number of Academic Seniors taking law work has also
increased. The figures follow:
I919-20 1920-21
Graduates ...................... 4 5
Third-year Class ................ 33 48
Second-year Class ............... 45 72
First-year -Class .................. 52 54
Academic Seniors (first-year) .... 41 45
175 224
The gaps in the ranks of the Faculty have been filled most satisfac-
torily, and the spirit of the School is all that could be desired.
The Summer session lasted from June 21st to August 31st with an
enrollment of seventy-five students, of whom two-thirds were second-
or third-year men. The courses offered included Criminal Law, Prop-
erty I, Private and Municipal Corporations, Suretyship, Code Pleading,
and Piiblic Service Law. The School was fortunate in having the
services of Professor Charles A. Huston, Dean of the Leland Stanford
Jr. University Law School, and Professor Thomas P. Hardman of
the West Virginia Law School.
Professor Wurts's courses will be taken over by Professor William
Reynolds Vance, who resigned as Dean of the Law School of the
University of Minnesota to accept the call to Yale. Professor Vance
was a member of our Faculty from i9IO to 1912, and it is with great
pleasure that all friends of the School will hear of his return: He
received the degrees of B.A. in 1892, M.A. in 1893, Ph.D. in 1895, and
LL.B. in 1897 from Washington and Lee University. For more than
twenty years he has been engaged in law teaching, and his successful
career as a teacher, as well as his recognized legal scholarship, give
assurance of the strength which his appointment will add to our
Faculty. In addition to Property II and III his courses will be
Insurance and Wills.
For the past year Professor Edgerton's courses have been in charge
of Mr. Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, one of our own graduates of the
Class of 1918. Mr. Llewellyn has resigned his instructorship to enter
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the practice of the profession in New York. His brilliant record as a
student has been continued as an instructor. His departure would be
a cause for much regret were it not regarded merely as a temporary
absence for the purpose of increasing his experience in preparation
for the resumption of his chosen career of law teaching.
To take over the work in Commercial Law carried by Mr. Llewellyn,
the services have been secured of another Yale graduate, Professor
Herschel W. Arant of Lamar School of Law, Emory University,
Atlanta. He received from Yale with high honors the degrees of
B.A. in 1911, M.A. in 1912, and LL.B. in 1915. Mr. Arant has been
Professor of Law and Secretary in the Lamar School since its organi-
zation in 1915. He has been granted a year's leave of absence in order
to serve on the Yale Faculty for the coming year. His courses will be
Bills and Notes, Persons, Sales, and Code Pleading.
A few changes in the curriculum remain to be noted. Professor
Morgan will give the course in Agency, and Professor Clark the course
in Equity I and in Partnership. Judge Beach will give the course in
Legal Ethics.
Professor Taft has again been forced to ask a year's leave of
absence to serve on the Canadian Government Commission to evaluate
the Grand Trunk Railway, but will return to the School within the
year. His course in Constitutional Law will be given by Professor
Borchard.
An important addition to the curriculum is a system of moot court
clubs for the first-year men, to be worked -out in connection with the
Introductory Course under Professor Morgan.
The spirit of co6peration in the School, led by the unity and enthu-
siasm of its Faculty, leads -the JouRN.AL to predict a great year in its
history.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS AND TIDE- LOWED LANDS
The recent case of Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay (192o, App.
Div.) 182 N. Y. Supp. 738, raises again the time-worn subject of the
title to the foreshore and the riparian proprietor's rights therein.
Throughout the United States various rules have been adopted to
determine such cases until the common-law rule as it existed in Eng-
land at the time of the settlement of the American colonies has been
so distorted as to make it scarcely recognizable.
In the principal case the plaintiff, who owned a large tract of land
on Cold Spring Harbor, received from the State Commissioners of
New York a grant of twenty-one acres of land under the waters of
the bay, which he filled in and thereby raised the land so that the
surface was above high water. The defendant town, claiming the
lands so granted, had established, in a former action,1 its title, under
'Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay (1913) 2o9 N. Y. I, io2 N. E. 585.
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a colonial patent from Governor Andros in 1677, and the invalidity
of the plaintiff's grant from the state. Having refused the plaintiff's
offer to restore the shore to its previous condition, the defendant
proceeded to erect public bath-houses on the reclaimed land. The
plaintiff brought this suit in equity asking for leave to restore the
foreshore, and for an injunction to restrain the defendant from build-
ing. The court granted the petition, holding that the title of the town
to the locus in quo was subject to the public rights of navigation and
to the right of access by riparian owners.
"The town's rights were public in this estuary; such, for example,
as ownership and regulation over oyster or other shell fish beds .... 2
But, except for some aid to commerce, fishing, or navigation, I find no
power to fill in the harbor, or to maintain parks or establish recreation
grounds upon lands reclaimed from lands under the water of this
harbor."3 ". . Lands in front of a riparian owner are not building
sites, save for structures in aid of navigation; and no supervening
right over any part of such place can be exercised or maintained to
the prejudice of the riparian owner."4
In England the title to the soil under tidal waters is, by the common
law, in the King.5 In this soil -the Crown has rights of 'two sorts:
(i) the jus privatum, which denotes a private proprietary right similar
to that exercised by a -holder of an estate in fee over his land; and
(2) the jus publicum, which is a right exercised by the sovereign as
a trustee on behalf of the public to secure to the people certain rights
of navigation and fishing in the waters. The jus privatum, although
the Crown may alienate it by grant in respect to any particular sec-
tion of the shore, is always subject to the jus publicum, which is
inalienable, and survives to the interest of the public no matter who
possesses the jus privatunt.8 A grant, from the sovereign, of land
bounded by the sea passes title to the high-water mark only, and does
not include the foreshore unless specifically mentioned. Where any
riparian owner, without such express grant, undertakes to build over
the high-water line, the Crown may declare such a structure a
purpresture and have it abated.7
After the time of the American Revolution these rights of the
'Rogers v. Jones (i&28, N. Y. Sup. Ct) i Wendell 237.
'Putnam, J., in the principal case.
4Matter of City of Buffalo (1912) 2o6 N. Y. 319, 99 N. E. 850.
"Hale, De Sure Maris (17th Cent.) cap. 4, reprinted in Moore, History of the
Foreshore, infra, note 6. Hall, Rights of the Crown in the Seashore (2d ed.
1875) 2.
'Mo6re History of the Foreshore (3d ed. 1888) 638; Attorney General v.
Parneter (18ri, Exch.) io Price, 378.
" See Shively v. Bowlby (1898) 152 U. S. 1, 13, r4 Sup. Ct. 548, 55a Gray, J.,
in a very concise statement of the English law, says, "By the law of England,
also, every building or wharf erected, without license, below high-water mark,
where the soil is the King's is a purpresture, and may, at the suit of the King,
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Crown became vested in the several states or their grantees,8 except
where title to submerged lands had previously been granted to towns
or individuals by royal grants, colonial charters, or patents,9 subject
only to the rights surrendered to the federal government by the Con-
stitution of the United 'States.10 It is generally acknowledged that
the rules governing the rights of the state and of the riparian pro-
prietors are to be determined by each state for itself according to its
statutes, customs, and usages." There seem to 'be two distinct theories
which the courts have adopted in regard to land under public waters :1
(i) the so-called trust theory, by which the state is held to own the
lands in fee, not in a proprietary capacity, but in trust for the public ;13
and (2) a theory by which the state occupies a position in respect to
such submerged lands analogous to that of the Crown in England.14
either be demolished, or be seized and rented for his benefit, if it is not a nuisance
to navigation."
See also, a very clear analysis of the development of the English law by Prof.
Everett Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters (igi8) 2 MINN. L. REy. 313,
315. Prof. Fraser shows how the prima facie theory of the ownership by the
Crown of the land under tidal waters is based on a presumption contrary to the
facts. "The riparian owners in England had by actual possession or by actual
grant from the Crown acquired title to the submerged lands of the Kingdom."
One Digges in the reign of Elizabeth wrote a treatise claiming to prove the
prima facie title of the Crown to the foreshore. This doctrine was adopted by
the courts in the reign of Charles I. Attorney General v. Philpott, cited in
Attorney General v. Richards (1795, Exch.) 2 Anstr. 607. See also Moore,
op. cit., note 6, at p. 262.
8 Shively v. Bowlby, supra, note 7. The English common law of course applied
in full in America until the Revolution. Angell, Tide Waters (2d ed. 1847) 36.
'Brookhaven v. Smith (i9o7) 188 N. Y. 74, 8o N. E. 665; Tiffany v. Town of
Oyster Bay, supra, note I.
"Martin v. Waddell (1842, U. S.) i6 Pet. 367. The sovereign powers passed
from the Crown to the Continental Congress and finally to the federal govern-
ment after the adoption of the Constitution. At present the sovereign power is
in the United Scates and not in any individual state. Logically then the ius
privatum and the ius publicum of England should have passed to the federal
government. This reasoning has not been followed. Courts uniformly hold
these powers to be in the state, subject only to the right of the federal govern-
ment to improve lands for navigation and commerce. Charles G. Stevenson,
Title of Land under Water in New York (1914) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 397.
"Barney v. Keokuk (1876) 94 U. S. 324; State v. Korrer (1914) 127 Minn. 6o,
66, 148 N. W. 617, 619; Shively v. Bowlby, supra, note 7, at p. 49.
See NoTE, Rights in the Foreshore (19o9) 9 COL. L. REv. 174.
"McClennan v. Prentice (1893) 85 Wis. 427, 55 N. W, 764; Brookhaven v.
Smith, supra, note 9. See also State v. Korrer, supra, note ii, at p. 78: "The
decision of this court explicitly holds that the state owns the bed of this lake below
low-water mark; 'not, however, in the sense of ordinary absolute proprietorship
with the right of alienation, but in its sovereign capacity, for common public use,
and in trust for the people of the state for the public purposes for which they are
adapted.'"
"Stevens v. Patterson, etc. Ry. (187o) 34 N. J. L. 532, 545; Eisenbach v. Hat-
field (1891) 2 Wash. 236, 26 Pac. 539; Gould v. Ry. (1852) 6 N. Y. 522. For a
modified construction of the common-law rule see Town of Orange v. Resnick
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This is practically a modification of the common-law rule varying
according to the customs of each individual state.
The trust-theory has arisen from a misconstruction of certain early
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
5 This doctrine
has been severely criticized'8 on the ground that it ignores the jus
privatum and disposes of the problem as if the jus publicum included
all the rights of the sovereign in the land.
7 "That the state holds the
subaqueous lands in trust with respect to the jus publicum is, for the
present, assumed. That it holds them in trust with respect to the
jus privatum is impossible, unless there may be an inalienable trust
without a cestui que truft in esse or in posse. . . . It is submitted
that the corporate state has both legal and beneficial interest in the
jus privatum, with the power to use or alien it for any enjoyment not
inconsistent with the public or riparian rights, that the trust theory
only requires at the most these special rights to be preserved, and
that its extension to include the jus privatun is unsound."
The second theory, although following the basic principles of the
English common-law doctrine, has progressed' along different lines.
Some courts flatly refuse to allow the riparian owner any rights what-
ever in the foreshore beyond those possessed by the general public.',
Other courts are more liberal and recognize special rights in littoral
owners arising from the situation of their upland.'
9
The rule in most states recognizes the high-water mark as the
boundary of the estate of the riparian owner.
20  There is also very
little disagreement as to the rights of the public: namely, the rights
of navigation2 ' and the right of fishery.2 ' The confusion arises prin-
(1920, Conn.) 1O9 Atl. 864. See also Tillinghast, Tide-Flowed Lands and
Riparian Rights in the U. S. (1905) i8 HARv. L. Rv. 341, for a somewhat
different classification.
"Martin v. Waddell, supra, note io; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan (845, U. S.)
3 How. 212.
"Fraser, Title to Soil Under Public Waters-The Trust Theory, 2 MINN. L.
REv. (1918) 429, .436. See also Farnham, Waters (19o4) 172;
11 See Fraser, op cit. 432.
"See Anders, C. J., in Eisenbach v. Hatfield, supra: "The result of our inves-
tigation of the authorities leads us to the conclusion that riparian proprietors
on the shore of the navigable waters of the state have no special or peculiar
rights therein as an incident to their estate."
"Town of Orange v. Resnick, supra, note 14; Harlan and Hollings'worth v.
Paschall (1882) s Del. Ch. 435; Norfolk City v. Cooke (1876, Va.) 27 Gratt. 430;
Rumsey v. Ry., (I89z) 133 N. Y. 79, 30 N. E., 654; Commonwealth v. Alger
(1851, Mass.)' 7 Cush. 53, 64.
' Several states have adopted a contrary doctrine: Commonwealth v. Alger,
supra, note 19;, Fulmer v. Williams (1898) 122 Pa. 191, 15 At. 726; Harlan and
Hollingsworth v. Paschall, supra, note 19. See also by statute in Virginia Groner
v. Foster (1897) 94 Va. 65o, 657, 27 S. E. 493.
'See Angell,.Tide Waters (2d ed. I847) ch. 4.
2Id. ch.5.
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cipally in the exercise by the state'or its grantees of the jus privatum
and in the construction to be given to the special rights, if any, of
riparian proprietors.
Under the English common law the riparian owner was "accorded
no right in the absence of a license therefor, to build anything below
high-water mark and 'has no rights higher than those of the General
Public.' "23 Without greatly altering its basic principles, the rule
itself has been modified by more recentEnglish decisions.24 In the
United States a few courts still enforce the strict common-law rule
as it existed at the time of its adoption by the American colonies.2 5
The hardships instant to the application of such a rule under the
changed conditions of modem times has been generally recognized,
and, bath ,by court action and, in some cases, by legislation, riparian
owners have been accorded a right of access to the water .2  This
right is generally broad enough to include the privilege of erecting
wharves, and is subject only to the paramount rights of the public.27
This appears to be a movement in the right direction. The principal
change in. the common-law rule seems to be the subjection of the jus
privatum to a riparian right of access in addition to the jus publicum.
In extending the rights of the riparian owner in this way, the courts
are not altering the frame-work of the old common-law doctrine.
As long as the title to the submerged lands is in the state, the jus
privatum remains, although somewhat modified. The proprietary
rights of the state in the foreshore and in subaqueous lands still exist
and should include everything not inconsistent with the riparian
owner's rights and the jus publicum.
"LOCUS REGIT ACTUM" AND THE FRENCH LAW OF WILLS
The continental rules of the conflict of laws applicable to wills
differ profoundly from those of Anglo-American law. In conse-
quence of the Roman doctrine of universal succession, upon which the
modem continental law of testamentary and intestate succession is
based, the estate as a whole passes to the heirs irrespective of the
character of the property as real or personal. The conception of the
right of succession as one in universum jus has profoundly affected
the rules of the conflict of laws. As the heir is deemed in legal theory
to continue the personality of the -decedent it is felt that the devolu-
'Gray, J., in Brookhaven v. Smith, supra, note 9.
"Lyons v. Fishmongers Co. (1876) L. R. i A. C. 662; Buccleuch v. Metro-
politan Board of Works (1872) L. R. 5 H. L. 418.
"Eisenbach v. Hatfield, supra, noie 14.-
"Farnham, op. cit., note i6, secs. 62-75.
'Farist Steel Co. v. Bridgeport (1891) 6o Conn. 278, 22 AUt. 56I; Revell v.
People (1899) 177 III. 468, 52 N. E. IO 2; Miller v. Commissioners of Lincoln
Park -(1917) 278 Ill. 400, 116 N. E. 178; Barnes v. Midland Ry. (i9o8) 193
N. Y. 378, 85 N. E. 1O93. See also note, 4o L. R. A. 593.
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tion of his property should be controlled by his personal law, that is,
by the law of the country to which the decedent belonged (formerly by
the lex domicilii). This view has found expression in most of the
modern codes.' The framers of the Code Napol6on were not ready,
however, to accept this principle in its totality. Indeed, Article 3 of
the Civil Code expressly provides that "real estate, even when owned
by foreigners, is governed by French law." It is held accordingly
that the descent of French immovables is governed by French law
irrespective of the nationality of the decedent.
2  Article 3 is limited
in its application, however, to "substantive rights of. property" and
does not determine the validity of wills disposifig of immovable prop-
erty as regards the "capacity" of the testator or the "formalities"
of execution. The "capacity" to dispose of movable and immovable
property upon death has been held on the continent, since the days of
Bartolus, to be governed by the "personal" law of the testator. Even
the great French champion of the theory of the territoriality of law,
D'Argentr6, did not dare to challenge a rule so firmly established in
practice.3 It has remained the traditional rule in France to this day,
4
notwithstanding the attack made upon it by the Dutch school.
5
As regards the "formalities" with which wills must be executed it is
generally held on the continent that the rule locus regit actum applies.
6
Through the influence of Bartolus and of Dumoulin the view became
established that a will executed in the form prescribed by the local
law should be valid everywhere.7 D'Argentr6 was opposed to the
doctrine in its application to wills disposing of immovable property
and his successors in Belgium succeeded in 1611 in restoring the
'Italy: Art. 9, Prel. Disp. Civ. Code; App. Genoa, March 16, 1887 (1887)
La Legge, 2, 31o; App. Milan, March 21, I9O5 (i906) Clunet, 1236; Cass. Turin,
May 31, i8gi (i88i) Monitore, 673. Germany: Art. 24, par. i, Art. 25, Intr. Ac
Civ. Code. See also Japan: Art. 25, Law Concerning the Application of Laws in
General (Hfrei).
'Cass. Jan. 26, i892 (1892) Dalloz, 1, 497; App. Paris, Dec. 31, 1889 (i89r)
Dalloz, 2, 41. The movable property of a deceased foreigner will be distributed
in France in accordance with French law if the decedent had an "authorized"
domicil in France. Cass. May 5, 1875 (875) Sirey, i, 4o9; (2875) Dalloz, 1, 343;
App. Pau, May 14, i9o7 (igO7) Clunet, Iiog. In the absence of such a domicil
his national law will govern. Cass. Jan. 26, 1892 (i892) Dalloz, 1, 497; May 8,
1894 (1894) Dalloz, 1, 355; March 8, i9og (igo) Dalloz, I, 305. The above
rules are to be understood in the renvoi sense. Cass. June 24, 2878 (1879)
Dalloz, i, 56; Feb. 22, 1882 (1882) Sirey, 1, 393; (1882) Dalloz, I, 302; March
x, 1io (9io) Clunet, 888; (I9io) Revue de droit international privi, 870.
a2 Lain6, Introduction au droit international prvi, 224.
"France: App. Paris, August io, 1872 (1874) Clunet, 128 (semble). Germany:
Arts. 7, 24, Introductory Act, Civ. Code. Italy: Art. 6, Prel. Disp. Civ. Code.
(1918) 23 ILl L. REv., 386.
As to the origin of the maxim locus regit actum, see (I91I) 20 YALE LAW
JOURNA1, 428, note 3.
" (i9ii) 20 YALE LA w JoouAi, 427-428.
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supremacy of the law of the situs as regards such wills. The tradi-
tional rule became reEstablished, however, in that country in 1634
and has apparently not been questioned since." The rule that a legal
transaction conforming to the local law as regards the mode of exe-
cution should 'be regarded as valid everywhere was dictated by con-
siderations of convenience and justice.9 A person becoming suddenly
ill away from home might not be able to comply with the law of his
domicil or with that of the situs of the land, so that, if he could not
make use of the forms prescribed by the local law, he would be deprived
of the faculty of executing a will. In its origin the rule locus regit
actum was an optional rule. In the course of time the reasons that
had prompted' its acceptance were lost sight of, and as the rule was
commonly stated in the categorical form indicated it was assumed
to have a mandatory character.1o This became the established -law in
France through the decision of the Parliament of Paris in the case
In re Pommereuil, decided in 1721.
Most of the modern codes, in recognition of the origin of the rule
locus regit actum, assign to it'only an optional character.,, The matter
is not so clear, however, under the provisions of the French Civil Code.
Article 999 provides as follows:
"A Frenchman who is in a foreign country can make his will by
instrument under private signature, as is specified in Article 970, or
by public instrument (acte authentique), according to the form in use
in the place where such instrument shall be made."
The first draft of the code relating to the question contained the fol-
lowing general provision: "The form of legal transactions is governed
by the law of the country in which they are executed or take place."
' (19i) 20 YAT-E- LAW JOURNAL, 428. See also Italy: Art. 9, Prel. Disp. Civ.
Code; Cass. Turin, May 31, 188i (I88i) Monitore, 673. Germany: Arts. 1I, 24,
Intr. Act. Civ. Code. Spain: Art. ii, Civ. Code; Japan: Art. 26, H6rei.
'Ii is Lain6's great merit to have shown this. 2 Introduction au droit inter-
national privi, 328; (19o5) Revue de droit international privi, 21, 456; (19o7)
ibid., 833; see also Naquet (19o4) Clunet, 39;" Surville (19o6) Clunet, 961.
18 (19r) 2o YAiE LAW JOURNAL, 430-431.
'A will may be executed either in conformity with the law of the place of
execution or in accordance with the national law of the testator. Germany:
Arts. ii, 24 Intro. Act. Civ. Code; Greece: App. Athens, June 6, 1895 (1897)
Clunet, 623; Italy: Art. 9, Prel. Disp. Civ. Code; Cass. Turin, May 31, 1881
(188i) Monitore, 673; Japan: Art. 26, H6rei. Where the national law of the
testator prohibits its subjects from executing holographic wills even when abroad
the Italian court will enforce the prohibition, notwithstanding the fact that
the will is valid according to the local law. Cass. Turin, April 12, 1892 (1892)
Monitore, 346. The law of the situs of the land need not be satisfied. Austria:
5 Piittlingen, Handbuch des internationalen Privatrechts, 66; Italy: Art. 9, Prel.
Disp. Civ. Code; Germany: Arts. II, 24, Intro. Act. Civ. Code; Russia: Cass.
Feb. ii, i9o4 (i9o6) Clunet, 89o.
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The article was dropped, however, at the last moment because it was
deemed too general and it was feared that it might lead to abuse and
erroneous applications.12  The omission of the general provision just
mentioned in connection with the particular wording of Article 999
has given rise to much controversy in France. It is to be noted in the
first place that Article 999 speaks only of Frenchmen executing wills
abroad. Under the terms of the provision it is manifest that French
subjects are privileged to execute their wills in the French holo-
graphic' 3 form without regard to the law of the place of execution
or the nature or location of the property.14 It is also clear that they
can validly execute a public will in the form in use in the place of
execution. But what if the local law does not recognize a public will
or, if it does, authorizes at the same time other forms of wills and the
will in question is a private will? Here the question is thus presented
whether the word "authentic" in Article 999 is to be understood in
the technical sense of the French legislition or whether it simply has
reference to any kind of "solemn" will authorized by the lex loci.
The courts have given to the Article the more liberal meaning so that
the ordinary Anglo-American will, signed by the testator before wit-
nesses, will be sustained by the French courts if it satisfies the law
of the place of execution. 5 A recent decision of the Civil Court of
the Seine, Violette v. Procureur de la R~publique,16 conformed to this
view and upheld the will of a French lady which she had executed in
England according to the provisions of the English Wills Act.
'See 2 Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux priparatoires du Code Civil, 6;
Merlin, Ripertoire, Loi, Sec. 6, Nos. 7 and 8; Lain6 (19o5), Revue de droit
interuztional privi, 456-475; (19o7) ibid., 857-866.
"As to holographic wills, see (1918) 28 YALa LAW JOURNAL, 72. The French
law recognizes three kinds of wills, the holographic, the public and the mystic.
The holographic will must be wholly written, dated and signed by the testator.
Art. 970, Civ. Code. The public will is taken down by a notary from the tes-
tator's dictation, and, after being read over by the notary in the presence of the
witnesses, is signed by the testator, notary, and two witnesses together with a
second notary, or by the testator, notary and four witnesses. Arts. 971-974, Civ.
Code. The mystic or secret will is written by the testator or a third party,
signed by the testator and handed closed and sealed to a notary in the presence
of at least six witnesses, or is closed and sealed in their presence. The testator
has to affirm that he has signed it as his will, and then a proc~s verbal to this
effect is drawn up by the notary and duly signed by the testator, notary and
witnesses. Art. 976. Concerning military and maritime wills see Colin (1897)
Clunet, 508, and Arts. 981 ff. Civ. Code, with subsequent amendments.
'4 App. Paris, June 3, 1878 (878) Clunet, 613.
"Cass. Feb. 6, 1843 (1843) Sirey, 1, 218 (English will); Feb. 28, 1854 (1854)
Dalloz, i, 126; July 3, 1854 (854) Dalloz, 1, 313 (Louisiana will); August ig,
1858 (1859) Dalloz, 1, 81; App. Paris, August io, 1872 (1873) Dalloz, 2, 149
(California will); Feb. 26, 1896 (1897) Clunet, 337 (English will); Trib. civ.
Seine, March 1I, 1899 (I899) Clunet, 1014; App. Rouen, Jan. 4, 1911 (191I)
Clunet, 940; (I912) Revue de droit international privi, 124; Trib. civ. Lille, June
27, 1912; App. Douai, Dec. 3, 1912 (1913) Clunet, 1285 (English will).
" Trib. civ. Seine, Feb. 6, 1919 (i929) Clunet, 756.
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A French subject may execute his will abroad, therefore, either in
the French holographic form or in any "authentic" or "solemn" form
recognized by the lex loci. Whether the French courts will go beyond
this and allow French subjects to execute their wills under all circum-
stances in any form authorized by the local law is doubtful. So far
they have felt constrained by the specific wording of Article 999 to
hold that the local form cannot be followed if it has no "authentic"
character under the lex loci.
17
No distinction is made by the French law between wills disposing
of movable or immovable property.18 Under treaties between France
and a number of other countries and it seems even in countries with
which France has no treaty, French subjects are enabled to execute
wills before their consuls.1 9
There is no provision in the French Code regarding the execution
of wills by foreigners. The problem arises therefore whether the
provisions of Article 999 are to be applied by way of analogy with
respect to them. That foreigners could execute wills in France under
the Civil Code, in accordance with the traditional rule, in the mode
prescribed by the French law was never doubted.2 0 A foreigner may
dispose of his French property, therefore, by holographic will, not-
withstanding the fact that such wills are not recognized by his national
law.2 1 Such a will has been sustained even where the national law of
the testator has prohibited the subjects of such country from executing
such wills even while abroad.2 The problem that has aroused a great
' Cass. Feb. 28, 1854 (1854) Dalloz, 1, 126; July 3, 1854 (1854) Dalloz, 1, 313.
'App. Paris, June 3, i878 (1878) Clunet, 613. A Frenchman can make a will
therefore in France only in accordance with the local law. 1o Aubry & Rau,
Droit civil (5th ed.) 593.
"' See Dalloz, Codes Annotis, Nouveau Code Civil, Art. 999, nos. 34 ff. It is
held by most courts that Art. 999 of the Civil Code has not abrogated Art. 24,
tit. 9, bk. 1 of the Marine Ordinance of i68i, according to which a will might be
"received" by the Chancellor of a French consulate in the presence of a consul
and two witnesses and signed by them. Cass. March 20, 1883 (i883) Dalloz,
i, x45; App. Aix, Feb. 16, x87x (1872) Dalloz 2, 52; App. Dijon, April 9, 1879
(1879) Dalloz, 2, xo8. As the ordinance does not specify the formalities in detail
it is held that the requirements of the Civil Code and of the law concerning
notaries (25 vent. an ii, art. 68) govern. Cass. March 20, 1883 (1883) Dalloz,
I, 145; June 3, i89I (1892) Dalloz, I, 317; Jan. 23, 1893 (1893) Dalloz, x, 83.
' A foreigner, not understanding the French language, cannot make a public
will in France unless he can find a notary and witnesses who understand his own
language. 4 Weiss, Traiti de droit international privi (2d ed.) 663, note; App.
Rennes, Jan. 8, 1884 (1885) Sirey, 2, 24; see also Cass. August 3, i8gi (1893)
Dalloz, 1, 3X. According to Cass. Belge May 5, 1887 (i888) Dalloz, 2, 12o, the
witnesses need not understand the testator's language. Some early decisions
have allowed the use of an interpreter. Colin (1897) Clunet, 932, note.
Cass. August 25, 1847 (1847) Sirey, 1, 712; App. Aix, July xI, 1881 (1882)
Clunet, 4z6; Trib. civ. Seine, July 21, 1883 (1884) Clunet, 405; App. Paris,
May 7, i897 (1897) Clunet, 8x6.
'Cass. August 25, 1847 (1847) Dalloz, 1, 273; App. Orleans, August 4, i859
(1859) Dalloz, 2, 158; (i86o) Sirey, 2, 37.
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deaf of discussion is whether the rule of locus regit actum has retained
under the Civil Code its former imperative character. In a decision
of the Court of Cassation (by the Chambre de Requates) of March
9, 1853, it was held that the former character of the rule had not been
changed by the Civil Code as regards foreigners executing wills in
France.23  This view maintained itself in the courts until i909 when
the Court of Cassation (Chambre Civile) overthrew the doctrine in
the celebrated case of Gesling v. Viditz,2" in which the optional char-
acter of the rule was recognized with respect to foreigners executing
wills in France. Foreigners in France may execute their wills, there-
fore, so far as the French courts are concerned, in any of the forms
prescribed by French law or if they execute a private will by con-
forming to the requirements of their national law.25 It is obvious
that a public will in the technical sense cannot be executed in France
except in the French form, for a French notary executing a will in
a foreign form is deemed to act in a private and not in his official
capacity.2 6 The national law may be followed, it would seem, regard-
less of the character of property as movable or immovable.
2
T
A foreigner abroad may under French law execute his will in the
form prescribed by the law of the place of execution or by his national
'Cass. March 9, 1853 (1853) Dalloz, 1, 217; App. Aix, July ii, z88I (1883)
Sirey A 249; App. Paris, August ii, 1892 (1893) Clunet, 418; March 2o, I8W6
(896) Clunet, 402. Contra, App. Rouen, May 7, 1898 (8.99) Clunet, 578; Trib.
Sup. de Papeete, Sept. 22, i88 (1899) Clunet, 595.
"'Cass. July 2o, igog (igog) Clunet, io97. The reversal of its former position
by the Court of Cassation resulted, it seems, partly from the historical investiga-
tions into the origin of the rule locus regit actum by Lain6 and partly from the
acceptance of the rule in its optional form by the convention of the Hague. See
(i9p) Revue de droit international prizv, g5. The Hague convention of
July 17, i9o5, relating to succession, provides: "Wills are valid, as regards form,
if they conform either to the law of the place where they are executed, or with
the law of the country of which the deceased was a subject at the time of their
execution." Art. 3, par. i. The decision of the Court of Cassation was accepted
by App. Amiens, Dec. II, 1912 (913) Clunet, 947.
' Politis is of the opinion that under the decision of the Court of Cassation
of July 20, isog, a will can be sustained only if the testator intended to execute
his will with reference to a particular law. For example, if an American citizen
domiciled in Connecticut should go to a French notary and execute his will in
the presence of three witnesses its validity should depend, according to this
writer, upon the fact whether he intended to execute a will according to the
Connecticut or the French form. If he intended to execute it in thi French form
the will would be invalid. (1911) Dalloz, 1, 186. As regards citizens of the
United States their "national" law is held to be the law of the state in which
the testator was domiciled at the time of the execution of the will, or, if he was
no longer domiciled at that time in the United States the law of the state in
which he had his last domicil.
Politis (zig") Dalloz, i, 186.
'Trib. civ. Seine, Dec. 23, 188i (1882) Clunet, 322; App. Aix, July ii, i88I
(5882) Clunet, 426; Trib. Sup. de Papeete, Sept. 22, 1898 (i89g) Clunet, 595;
Colin (1897) Clunet, 938, 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie, Des donations entre vifs et des
testaments (3d ed.) no. 2249; io Aubry & Rau, op. cit., 598.
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law, 28 and this rule applies, it seems, to wills disposing of real property.
A will relating to French real property may be executed also, accord-
and to Aubry & Rau, 29 in'conformity with French law, that is in the
holographic form of Article 970 of the French Civil Code.
It remains to be seen whether the French courts in the development
of the rule locus regit actum in its application to wills will restrict the
parties to a choice between the law of the place of execution and their
national law, or whether they will allow them to execute them with
reference to the law of their domicil, and, if the will relates to land,
with reference to the law of the situs. Another interesting question
will be whether, for the sole purpose of sustaining wills, they will
extend the application of the renvoi doctrine to the formal requirements
of wills.
E. G. L.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH-A NOTE ON PROFESSOR CORWIN'S ARTICLE
As was to be expected, Professor Corwin, in his article appearing
earlier in this number of the JOURNAL' upon freedom of speech and
press, accomplishes the difficult task of illuminating further a subject
which has already been the occasion for much able discussion. Never-
theless, the very diversity of inferences which have been drawn by
competent writers from the historical background against which stands
the First Amendment warns us that contemporary construction gives
no final answer to the problems we have to solve. Thus, from the
well-known fact that opposition to the Sedition Act of 1797 was in
part at least f6unded on doctrines of states' rights, Professor Corwin
would appafently draw the inference that nationalists should uphold
a broad view as to the power of Congress over speech and the press.
But Mr. Hart has shown clearly the general consensus of opinion of
all parties at the time of the adoption of the Constitution that neither
by it nor by the First Amendment did Congress possess any general
power over these subjects.2 Hence the inference is logically one of
lack of power in Congress, and in fact its only powers in this regard
are such as may be considered fairly necessary to carry out the grants
of other powers to it.3 We must therefore always keep in mind that
our problem is the application of the constitutional provisions to
App. Paris, August 5, i886 (1887) Clunet, 621 ; Dec. 23, I9O9 (I9IO) Clunet,
6o4.
io Aubry & Rau, op. cit., 599.
'Freedom of Speech and Press Under the First Amendment: a Rjsum
(1920) 30 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 48. Other discussions are there cited.
'Hart, Power of Government over Speech and Press (192o) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 410.
'Ibid. This, of course, follows from the fact that the powers of Congress are
only those expressly or impliedly granted in the Constitution. Here there is no
express grant.
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present-day situations. Surely Professor Corwin cannot justly tax
liberal constructionists with inconsistency in asking that the restric-
tions of the First Amendment, too, shall not receive a construction
that will reduce them to nothing.
Now it should be noted that the cases under the present wartime
Espionage and Sedition Acts have raised questions of great importance
which are wider than the limited query as to the power of Congress.
These concern, among other things, the conduct of public prosecutors,
of judge, and of jury. In fact, in the important series of cases which
split the United States Supreme Court at its last term, the vital ques-
tion in each case was not that of the constitutionality of the law,
but whether the trial court had erred in holding that the prosecutor
had made sufficient case to go to the jury.' The constitutional ques-
tion was only indirectly involved, calling simply for a construction
of the law which would carry out the policy and comply with the
restrictions, of the First Amendment. This, in the view of the dis-
senting judges, required a directed verdict for the defendants, since
"a present danger of immediate evil or an [actual] intent to bring
it about was not shown." The majority have stated no limitation
of this kind, but have so far -taken the view that proof of the utterance
of any language having a tendency to produce the evils forbidden by
the statute makes a jury question. If this view is followed logically,
it is difficult to see why conviction could not be sustained on proof
of practically any agitation for the change of existing laws, since
such agitation may surely have a possible tendency to induce viola-
tions of such laws. And if a conviction may be sustained, the whole
benefit of the constitutional restriction is lost, for if it is to fulfill
any other puipose than that of an indefinite moral admonition, it
must operate to protect the individual from a jury which may under
unusual conditions, such as the stress of war emotions, be predisposed
against him.
To those of us who believe that at least the limitations set by the
minority, unsatisfactory and indefinite as they are, must be strictly
adhered to, both on general principle and because of the Constitution,
there seem, among others, two especially strong grounds for our
belief, one from the standpoint of the individual and one from -the
standpoint of the community. From the point of view of the indi-
vidual who appeals to the First Amendment for protection it appears
that the test of tendency only has given to prosecutors and courts
the opportunity, availed of under a misguided view of patriotism,
literally to pursue "poor and puny anonymities" in a way nothing
short of disgraceful to the mind of one trained in a law that accords
'Abrains v. United States (1919) 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17; Pierce v. United
States (1920, U. S.) 40 Sup. Ct. 205; Schaefer v. United States (I92O. U. S.) 40
Sup. Ct. 259.
" See (192o) 29 YALE LA W JOuRNA, 337, 677.
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the vilest wretch opportunity to show on a fair trial the innocence
presumed in his favor until proven guilty. Examples of this kind have
been collected in law review notes,6 and Professor Chafee has shown
in some detail the attitude of the trial court in the Abrams case.
7 In
enforcing such a law, which dearly will reach the fool more often than
the secret and clever intriguer, it is hard under the circumstances to
expect impartial juries. Experience has shown that the accused may
not even be sure of an impartial court.
But even more important than the fate of the few is the effect upon
the many. The only hope of success for a government of and by
the people is that the people should act under the spur of beliefs
formed without compulsion and as a result of arguments tested by
their power to get themselves "accepted in the market." Two of
the most admirable qualities of the ordinary citizen are his patriotism
and his respect for law. If an administration may brand views
opposed to its own as criminal-and, 'by sentences extraordinarily
long in comparison with all but the most heinous crimes, as danger-
ously criminal-its views need less intrinsic power to compete with
others for the support of such citizen. The Abrams case furnishes
an excellent example. The thought which Abrams and his associates
so intemperately expressed was that the United States should not
interfere with Soviet Russia. Subsequent events have shown that the
Administration's course in Russia has been at least of debatable wisdom.
But at the time when that public opinion was forming which either
tolerated or actively supported that course, the Administration had
the benefit of the exploitation by the press in news articles and edi-
torials of a conviction and sentence of twenty years' imprisonment
a (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 107; (1920) 33 HEAV. L. REV. 956. An ex-
ample is that of the trial in New York of the Russellites-members of a religious
order founded in 187o and opposed inter alia to war-where the trial judge in the
presence of the jury committed a witness for the defense to jail for contempt of
court for testifying that he had never seen a defendant write and could not
testify as to his signature, when the court 'thought he really could. Conviction
was followed by a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment upon seven of the
defendants and of ten years upon the other defendant, the judge's scathing com-
ments being prominently displayed in the press. The defendants were refused
admittance to bail pending appeal and were sent to Atlanta. Some time there-
after the Circuit Court of Appeals directed that they he admitted to bail and still
later ordered a new trial because of the possible prejudice resulting from the
contempt proceedings. Rutherford iv,. United States (i920, C. C. A. 2nd) 258
Fed. 855. The witness who was jailed had previously been ordered released by
the United States Supreme Court after ten months' confinement. Ex parte
Hudgings (1919) 249 U. S. 378, 39 Sup. Ct. 337. Cf. (i919) YALE LAW JOURNAL,
8M6. Thereafter the prosecutions were dropped.
' (1920). 33 HA v. L. Ray. 747. Cf. Schaefer v. United States, supra, where the
(ifth count, one of the counts upon which conviction was had, apparently rests
entirely upon a mistranslation in the 'indictment of a newspaper item originally
appearing in German. See COMMENTS (i920) 29 YALE. LAW JouRNAL,, 677.
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given an opponent of its views. The creation of such an opportunity
for the perversion of public opinion is too high U price to pay for
anything but the prevention of "a clear and imminent danger" to
he country. Perhaps this is not our most pressing danger, and yet
it is hard to see how in a democracy there can be a much more vital
one than that of such perversion of public opinion. Surely we have
had enough of views promulgated by the most high, to be religiously
accepted by all his followers.
C. E. C.
CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
During the last seven years the subject of the conflict of laws under
workmen's compensation acts has witnessed a decided trend of
authority away from the strictly territorial theory of the legislation
and in favor of that conception of the statute which regards it as a
legislative standardization of certain master and servant contracts
and therefore essentially a rule of contract law, applicable to all
contracts otherwise governed by the law of the enacting state. In
one respect, however, the divergent lines of authorities present a
significant contrast. The territorial rule has been adopted in four
jurisdictions and applied in seven cases,1 every one of which was a
case of an extraterritorial injury under a local contract, involving
therefore a renunciation of jurisdiction which would have been
asserted under the contract theory. The latter, on the other hand,
where accepted, has in every instance been established in cases involv-
ing a local contract of employment and an injury occurring outside
the state.2 Where the converse case of a local injury under a foreign
' Hicks v. Maxton (19o7) 124 L. T. Jour. 135; Tomalin v. S. Pearson & Son
[99] 2 K. B. 61; Schwartz v. India Rubber etc. Co. [1912] 2 K. B. 299; Gould's
Case (1913) 215 Mass. 480, IO N. E. 693; North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury
(I916) 174 Calif. I, 162 Pac. 93; Kruse v. Pillsbury (1917) 174 Calif. 222, 162
Pac. 891; Union Bridge & Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission (igig)
287 Ill. 396, 122 N. E. 6og. See also Keyes Davis Co. v. Allerdyce (April, 1913)
Mich. I. A. B.
'Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co. (1915) 89 Conn. 367, 94 AtI. 372; Grinnell
v. Wilkinson (I916) 39 R. I. 447, 98 Atl. 372; Rounsaville v. Central R. Co.
(I915) 87 N. J. L. 371, 94 AtI. 392; Post v. Burger (igi6) 216 -N. Y. 544, III
N. E. 351; Gooding v. Oft (1916) 77 W. Va. 487, 87 S. E. 862; Foughty v. Ott
(1917) 8o W. Va. 88, 92 S. E. 143; Jenkins v. Hogan & Sons (0917) 177 App.
Div. 36, 163 N. Y. Supp. 707; Gilbert v. Des Lauriers Column Mould Co. (1917)
i8o App. Div. 59, 167 N. Y. Supp. 274; Hagenback v. Leppert (1917, Ind. App.)
117 N. E. 531; State ex rel. Chambers v. District Ct. (I918) 139 Minn. 2o5, 166
N. W. 185; State ex rel. Maryland Casualty Co. v. District Ct. (1918) 140 Minn.
427, i68 N. W. 177; Industrial Commission v. Barene (igig) IO7 Misc. 486, 177
N. Y. Supp. 689; Holmes v. Communipaw Steel Co. (I919) 186 App. Div. 645,
174 N. Y. Supp. 772; Industrial Commission v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (igi8, Colo.)
174 Pac. 589; Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co. (igig) i6g Wis. io6, 170 N. W.
275; Pierce v. Bekins Van & Storage Co. (Igg, Iowa) I72 N. W. 191.
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contract has been presented, a remarkable course has been pursued.
The "contract" statute of New Jersey has repeatedly been held
applicable to injuries suffered in New Jersey under New York con-
tracts.3- The Connecticut act, though previously decided to be of the
"contract" type, has once been applied to an injury suffered in Con-
necticut under a Massachusetts contract of employment.
4 A recent
Indiana case5 adds a third to the jurisdictions swinging over to the
territorial rule by way of bringing local injuries under foreign con-
tracts within the operation of the local act, notwithstanding the fact
that the act in express terms rejected the territorial rule of applica-
tion,8 and had been held to belong to the contract class of statutes.'
In one state only has the contract theory been applied by way of
renunciation of the application of the local law."
May there not be some fundamental error in an interpretation which
so generally refuses to work both ways? If a preconceived theory
of construction has failed to take into account the dominant purpose
of an enactment, the case which under the theory calls for an exclu-
sion of the-application of the statute is most likely to reveal this fact,
for an instinctive perception of that dominant purpose is almost certain
in such a case to override the theory. Is not this unwillingness to
renounce jurisdiction in any case of local injury symptomatic of a
direction of the legislative interest very different from that presupposed
by the contract theory,--an interest in conditions of fact and not in
contracts as such?'
The contract theory is usually supported by reliance upon some of
the most superficial aspects of the legislation. It is not enough to
say that certain types of contracts are partially standardized as a
result of the enactment.' 0 All regtiations of the conditions of per-
formance of contracts produce this effect. It would probably not be
'American Radiator Co. v. Rogge (1914) 86 N. J. L. 436, 92 Atl. 85, 94 Atl. 85,
(i955) 87 N. J. L. 314, 93 Ati. iO83; Davidheiser v. Hay Foundry & Iron Works
(bi95) 87 N. J. L. 688, 94 Ad. 309; see also Gilbert v. Des Lauriers Column
Mould Co., supra.
"Douthwright v. Champlin (1917) 9i Conn. 5z4, ioo Atl. 97, (,917) 27 YALE
LAv JOURNAL, 113; but see Banks v. Howlett Co. (1918) 92 Conn. 368, io2 Atl.
822, (ig8) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 707, in which reliance was placed upon an
actual novation to bring the case within the statute.
5Hagenbeck & Great Wallace Show Co. v. Randall (192o, Ind. App.) 126
N. E. 5oi.
'Burns Ann. Ind. St. Ig8 Supp. sec. 8o2od I.
Hagenback v. Leppert, supra.
'Schweitzer v. Hamburg-American etc. Co. (1912) 78 Misc. 448, 138 N. Y.
Supp. 944 (common-law action); Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co.
(1917) i81 App. Div. 881, 167 N. Y. Supp. 475; Barnhart v. American Concrete
Steel Co. (1920, N. Y.) 525 N. E. 675 *(,compensation suit).
'See Young v. Duncan (1914) 258 Mass. 346, 349, io6 N. E. I, 3.
"Post v. Burger, supra; Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., supra; Pierce v.
Bekins Van & Storage Co., supra.
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contended that regulations of child labor or of the hours of labor
had other than a strictly territorial operation. Yet an eight-hour law
unquestionably reads its requirements into the terms of a contract
of employment made and to be performed within the state. The
question remains, what contracts are thus standardized, and to what
extent? And this question cannot be answered except by considering
whether this standardization was the dominant purpose of the statute,
as in the case of life insurance legislation, or merely the incidental
effect of an enactment primarily concerned with facts and not with
the conditions and modes of contracting.
If the compensation statute truly embodied a rule of contract law,
a court confronted by the case of an injury locally suffered under a
foreign contract of employment would feel no impulsion to indulge
in the palpable fiction of a new contract by reason of the crossing of
the state boundary.11 It has been suggested that this is no more
fictitious than the reading of the provisions of the lex loci contractus
into the original agreement.12  Such a contention ignores the vital
distinction between giving the law of the contract its natural and
necessary effect upon the legal incidents of the original agreement,
and inventing a novation of which the parties never dreamed for the
sole purpose of bringing into operation an otherwise inapplicable law.
Admittedly the sovereign of the locus delicti can regulate local con-
duct under a foreign contract. But the admission of a disposition to
do so is an admission that the regulation in question is not a matter
of contract law.
Similarly if the compensation statute were truly a rule of contract
law, the court of the place of injury would have no motive for refusing
effect to the foreign contract as determined by the foreign law. No
conflict could be perceived between such a contract and the public
policy of the place of injury, 3 for the local statute as a rule of con-
tract law would involve no declaration of policy concerning acts
performed under contracts with the regulation of which this contract
law could have no concern.
On the same principle, if the contract theory were true to the legal
facts, no difficulty would be felt in giving effect to a foreign com-
pensation statute in an action at common law brought in the locus
delicti, with respect to the waiver of common-law rights of action and
defences. Parties may by contract effect this result. Why should
not similar effect be given to a standardized agreement prescribed by
the law of the contract?" The lex loci delicti merely supplies the rule
See Americanr Radiator Co. v. Rogge, supra; Douthwright v. Champlin,
supra; Hagenbeck & Great Wallace Show Co. v. Randall, supra; see also I
Bradbury, Workicn's Compensation (2d ed. 1914) 56-57.
"Angell, Workmen's Compensation for Injury Abroad (I918) 3X HARv. LAw
REv. 61g, 623-624.
See Hagenbeck etc. v. Wallace, supra.
"4Schweitzer v. Hamburg-American etc. Co., supra.
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governing tort liability in the absence of an admissible contractual
modification. Whether and to what extent such a modification has
taken place should be referred without hesitation to the law governing
the contract as such.
Yet extreme reluctance is, shown to accept any of these conclusions.
With respect to the last point a curious situation has arisen. While
reliance is placed, in favor of the contract theory, upon the uncon-
troverted proposition that the liability created by the statute is not of
a tortious character, nevertheless it is felt that those provisions which
plainly modify and partially supersede a: branch of the law of torts,
are necessarily of a territorial character.15 Yet nothing could be
clearer than that the compensation statutes should be construed as a
whole, each provision being complementary to the rest and therefore
coextensive in application. The provision of a statutory waiver of
the common-law remedy, and the absolute or conditional abolition of
the defences of contributory negligence, the assumption of risk, and the
fellow servant rule, are indissolubly connected with the scheme of
compensation provided, as an obvious measure of inducement or
coercion for the purpose of giving effect to the latter. If a system
of compensation is designed to cover extraterritorial injuries, and if
when accepted it does not protect from common-law actions for such
injuries, the result is both irrational and severe. Especially would
this be true if the locus delicti, by hypothesis not the law of the con-
tract, chanced to have abolished the common-law defences.
The adoption of a theory which can not be consistently applied has
already brought into the courts cases of double recovery under the
statutes."R While the result was mitigated by an allowance, contrary
to predictions,17 of the proceeds of the former recovery in partial
satisfaction of the latter, the hardship and confusion of a double
proceeding remain.
Excessive stress upon the usual provision for an election
8 by the
employer and employee is largely responsible for the present impasse.
What is the character of this election and for what purpose is it
granted? The alternative of an aggravated common-law liability
would, if imposed absolutely, have been clearly territorial in char-
acter.18 The same should be true of the alternative of a limited lia-
bility irrespective of fault, and the permission or requirement of
insurance in lieu of this liability is merely a modification of the means
Vohnson v. Nelson (1915) 128 Minn. I58, I5o N. W. 20; Pendar v. H. & B.
American Machine Co. (1913) 35 P- I. 321, Atl. i; Piatt v. Swift (1915) i88
Mo. App. 584, I76 S. W. 434; Mitchell v. St. Louis S, neliing & Refining Co.
(igig, Mo. App.) 215 S. W. 5o6; see Angell, op. cit., 626.
" Gilbert v. Des Lauriers etc. Co., supra; Jenkins v. Hogan & Sons, supra.
11 See Rounsaville v. Central R. Co., supra, 374.
"Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., supra; Foughty v. Ott, supra; Hagen-
beck v. Leppert, supra. See Bradbury, op. cit., 48.
'Alabama Great Southern Ry. v. Carroll (1892) 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 8o3;
Payne v. New York, Susquehanna & W. Ry. (1911) 2o N. Y. 436, 95 N. E. ig.
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to the same legislative end. What new element is added by the grant
of an ostensible option between this aggravated common-law liability
and the scheme of insurance or of liability without fault? The allow-
ance of a degree of latitude in the character and conditions of redress
indicates no change in the direction of the legislative purpose. This
is the more evident in view of the fact that the option granted, at least
so far as the employer is concerned, is not and is not intended to be a
real one, but the aggravated common-law liability is designed to coerce
the employer into the acceptance of the ostensible alternative. As
evidence of the dominant legislative intention this fictitious option
should not be regarded otherwise than as a penal sanction.
While the important consideration is that a consistent and -so far
as possible uniform theory of the workmen's compensation statutes
should prevail,20 it is submitted that this end can be best achieved by
starting with an interpretation which accords with the motives under-
lying the legislation. This requirement is clearly not met by the
contract theory unfortunately prevailing.
FURTHER LIMITATIONS UPON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
The decision of. the United States Supreme Court denying the tax-
ability of stock dividends as income under the Sixteenth Amendment'
aroused a fever of interest before it was announced, culminating in
the stock market flurry caused by the erroneous first report of it.
2
Since its announcement it has been the subject of extensive comment,
,both favorable and adverse.8 It seems, however, to have been rather
" See also Coxam-mr (1917) 27 YAi LAw Jou.=NA xi3.
1Eisner v. Macomber (ig9o, U. S.) 4o Sup. Ct I8g.
'See CommENT (ig2o) 29 YAix LAw JouAi, 678.
'See article by the writer hereof, Eisner v. Macomber (i920) 29 YA LAW
JouRNA , 735. The soundest suggestion for upholding any part of the tax upon
stock dividends is given by Professor Warren, Taxability of Stock Dizidends as
Income (i92o) 33 HARv. L REv. 885. In effect,it is that accrued increases in
value of capital items are taxable and that Congress has the power to state, and
has here stated, what shall be the test to show that such gains have accrued. But,
it may be suggested: (i) that, as Professor Warren states, this would at most
only sustain the tax so far as levied upon the increase in value taking place while
the recipient of the stock dividend holds the'stockl and would leave so little of the
actual statute left and so unfair a resulting situation as to make it questionable
whether any of the statute should be upheld under such conditions; (2) that
declaring of a stock dividend by no means signifies an increase in value to the
extent of the-book value of the stock dividend-that being the taxable amount
[Art. i545 of (919) U. S. Int. Rev., Reg. 45J-but is ordinarily a suggestion of a
present partial increase and an augury of further increase in market value; and
(3) that the detlaration of a stock dividend may conceivably be an expression of
the opinion of the directors of the corporation that an increase in value has taken
place, but is no more an actual realization of a monetary gain to the stockholder
than a raise in a tax assessment by a board of assessors is such a realization to
the taxpayer.
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generally thought a blow to government revenues.' A few weeks
later the same Court without apparently stirring a ripple of interest
announced a decision which to the mind of the writer hereof -will mean
an infinitely greater loss in revenue to the government and will have
an infinitely greater effect upon our scheme of income taxation as a
whole. In Evans v. Gore (1920, U. S.) 40 Sup. Ct. 55o, which decided
that the salary of a federal judge was not taxable as income, the
,court finally settled decisively that the Sixteenth Amendment added
no new fields of taxation to those within the power of the federal gov-
ernment and expressly placed beyond the reach of that government all
income received either as salary or interest on indebtedness from the
various states and their local subdivisions. The opinion was by
Justice Van Devanter. Justice Holmes filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Justice Brandeis concurred.
There are two possible reasons for the lack of interest in this
case: one was that the particular question involved, recovery by a
federal judge of an income tax paid upon his salary, was of course
of limited scope and the larger question was only to be perceived upon
a study of the opinion; and the other was that many have doubtless
felt the non-taxability of state securities to be well settled. More-
over, the particular question also involved a consideration of another
point, namely the effect of the constitutional prohibition against
diminishing the compensation of a federal judge during his continuance
in office.5
It is true that the history of the Sixteenth Amendment and the
decisions under it gave much ground for this belief 'as to the question
of the taxability by the federal government of income received from
a state or its subdivisions. 6 Prior to the Amendment it had been held,
apparently without serious conflict of opinion, that as the power to tax
was the power to destroy, Congress had no power of taxation over
any instrumentalities of a state.7 When the Sixteenth Amendment
was proposed to the states, Governor Hughes of New York asked
the' assembly of that state to reject it on the ground that it gave such
'That the effect of Eisner v. Macomber, supra, upon government receipts will
not in the long run necessarily be large, see (i92o) 29 YALE LAw JOURNAI, 738.
5 Art. III, sec. i, of the Constitution. The salary of the President is subject to
a similar safeguard. Art. II, sec. i, cl. 6. The same question is there involved.
'See (i2o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 735, 740, 741. See also A. C. Ritchie,
Power of Congress to Tax State Securities, (1919) 5 Am. BAR Ass'N. JOUR. 602;
cf. Harry Hubbard, The Sixteenth Amendment, (920) 33 HARV. L. REv. 794.
"Collector v. Day (870, U. S.) ii Wall. 113, 114 (state salaries not taxable);
United States v. Baltinwre & Ohio Ry. (1872, U. S.) i7 Wall. 322 (municipal
bonds not taxable; two justices dissenting, one justice abstaining from decision) ;
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (i895) 157 U. S. 429, i5 Sup. Ct. 673,
(895) 158 U. S. 6oi, 15 Sup. Ct. 912, Ambrosina v. United States (i9o2) 187
U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 12; Farmer's, etc., Bank v. Minnesota (1914) 232 U. S. 5V6,
34 Sup. Ct. 354. Cf. South Carolina v. United States (i9o5) 199 U. S. 437, 26
Sup. Ct. ii, upholding a tax upon a non-governmental agency of a state.
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power to Congress and thus jeopardized the future existence of the
states. This called forth so much adverse comment at the time as
to lead the Supreme Court in the principal case to say that "the
apprehension was effectively dispelled and ratification followed." And
finally the Supreme Court has previously said in several cases that
the Amendment gave no new taxing power to Congress, but merely
removed a disability that hindered the method of levying a certain
kind of tax.8 Nevertheless, the question could not be considered
definitely settled until a decision had expressly considered the point,
for there had been some noteworthy accord with Governor Hughes'
views,' and the question had been considered so far open that it was
debated in Congress at the time when the income tax bill of 1918 was
under consideration. 10 Only last spring a powerful argument was
made in a law review article for the position now repudiated by the
majority of the Court, and its reasoning was accepted in toto by the
dissenting justices."
It was necessary for the Court to pass upon this matter, since it
first came to the conclusion, discussed hereafter, that under the
original Constitution the salaries of the federal judges could not be
subject to an income tax.1 2  Then the question arose whether the
Sixteenth Amendment by referring to "incomes from whatever source
derived" 1' had given such additional power to the federal government,
8Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry. (1916) 240 U. S. I, 36 Sup. Ct. 236; Stanton
v. Baltic Mining Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 1O3, 36 Sup. Ct. 278; Peck v. Lowe (19x8)
247 U. S. 165, 38 Sup. Ct. 432. See Ballantine, Constitutional Aspects of the
Excess Profits Tax (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 625. 628, and cf. comment on
these cases as dicta by Hubbard, op. cit. supra, note 6.
'Citations are given in Ritchie, op. cit. supra, note 6. See Professor R. C.
Minor, The Proposed Income Tax Amendment (igio) 15 VA. LAW REG. 737, 753;
A. C. Graves, Inherent Improprieties in the Income Tix Amendment (191o) 19
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 505, 528; Governor A. E. Willson of Kentucky, The Income
Tax Amendment (191) 43 CHI. LEG. NEWS, 251, quoting from a letter of
Governor Hughes.
10 The House supported such a measure, but the Senate did not. See Ritchie,
op. cit. supra, note 6. The language of the present Act, however, is broad
enough to include incomes from salaries of state and local officials and appar-
ently in the view of the Senate Finance Committee the constittitional question
was to be raised. Montgomery, Income Tax Procedure, (1920) 268, 269. The
Attorney General has, however, ruled against the collection of a tax on such
income. (1919) 31 Op. Atty. Gen. 441. Senator Knox supported the constitu-
tionality of a tax on the income of state securities under the war powers of the
government. Cong. Rec. (65th Cong., 2d sess.) 11854, 11859-ii86i. See argu-
ments contra of Senator Kellogg, id. 12179, and of Professor Taft, id. 12451.
11 Hubbard, op. cit. supra, note 6.
"Under the provisions cited in note 5, supra.
""The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and
without regard to any census or enumeration." The words in italics did not
appear in the original amendment proposed in Congress, but the wording was,
"direct taxes upon incomes." See Hubbard, op. cit. supra, note 6.
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a question the answer to which, as the court expressly states, decides
the question of the taxability of all incomes received from the states. 1
Quite probably the words quoted from the Amendment were inserted
in part at least to blot out all distinctions between incomes from dif-
ferent sources. The famous Pollock case had suggested such dis-
tinctions, stating that a tax on the gains or profits from business,
privileges, or employments as distinguished from income from real
and personal property and the like, might be sustained as an "excise
tax." 5 Nevertheless, there is nothing in such history to demand a
decision that these words add nothing to the previous definitions by
the Court of taxable income. On the contrary, the ordinary meaning
of the all-inclusive words used would seem to demand the opposite con-
struction, namely one including all kinds of income, no matter from
what source derived. The decision unduly limits the words used in
the Amendment, a limitation which it attempts to justify by defining
the purpose of the Amendment as in effect to remove the restrictions
stated in the Pollock case, i. e. the requirement of apportionment.
It is submitted that there is nothing in this historical background to
make nedessary the attributing of such a limited purpose to the
framers of the Amendment and to require the consequent restriction
of the plain language of the Amendment. The arguments to be drawn
from certain facts, namely, that the Pollock case also held taxes upon
municipal bonds invalid, and that the wording of the amendment was
changed in Congress to include the broader designation of income,
point the other way.18
There is another view which lends weight to a contrary construc-
tion of the Amendment and even makes doubtful the court's view of
the law irrespective of the Amendment. That is the question how far
for the purpose of a tax figured on a general balance struck after
adding all gains and subtracting all proper deductions for the year
it is possible or permissible to consider such balance as composed of
items from separate sources. As Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent puts
it, at some point money received as salary loses its specific character
as such and becomes intermingled with the general funds of the owner.
Thus, if put into a house, the house of the judge is not tax-exempt,
"Since, in the view of the cases cited in note 7, supra, such income was taxable,
if at all, only under the Sixteenth Amendment.
" See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. (i895) 158 U. S. 6oi, 635, x5 Sup.
Ct. 912, 920.
"8 It should be remembered that in the Pollock case the Court held, five to four,
that taxes on income from property were direct taxes and hence required equal
apportionment, and further held unanimously that taxes on income from state
securities were beyond the power of Congress. The Act under consideration
there was improper for both reasons. The latter portion of the Sixteenth
Amendment would remove the first objection, while the words in italics, espe-
cially in view of the change from the original form proposed (see note 13,
supra), would be surplusage unless they remove the second objection.
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and so if converted into other things subject to taxation, e. g. playing
cards subject to the federal government's excise tax. There seems
to be no reason why a man's income may not be treated as one entire
fund for the year, and it is reasonable to suppose an intention of the
framers of the Amendment to do away with all questions of its
derivation so long only as it is income.
This argument had been well developed -by the government to meet
the contention that the tax violated the Constitution because it dimin-
ished the judge's compensation during his term of office, and it had
met with the approval of the lower court.17 Moreover the Attorney
General in a well-reasoned opinion given last year had argued that
the tax, at most, had "increased the cost of living by creating a new
obligation of citizenship, to the discharge of which a part of the
salaries must be devoted.""' Here, too, admitting all that the majority
say as to the vital necessity of an independent judiciary, it seems hard
to justify their construction of the constitutional provision as to the
diminishing of compensation. They properly hold it was intended
primarily for the benefit of the public to secure a proper judiciary,
and was not designed for the benefit of the individual judges. Hence
the purpose involved was to prevent any legislative attacks upon the
judges' livelihood which might render them subservient to that branch
of the government. It is difficult to see how the distribution of the
burdens of government over all the citizenry without discrimination is
going to have any particular effect in destroying the independence of
the judiciary.' 9
Such a view of income as a blended mass the Court had tended to
foster by certain of its decisions under the Amendment. Thus it had
held that a tax levied upon the income of a corporation of which more
than two thirds was derived from exports did not violate the pro-
'Evans v. Gore (1919, N. D. Ky.) 262 Fed. 55o, approved in (192O) 18 MICH.
L. Rxv. 698.
' (919) 3i Op. Atty. Gen. 475, 484. The Attorney General, as well as counsel
for the government and the court below, had felt it necessary to concede, in view
of the cases cited in note 8, supra, that the Sixteenth Amendment gave no new
taxing power to Congress. The dissent indicates that the concession was unwise.
See citations in notes 17 and i8, supra, and see especially 262 Fed. 552. The
Supreme Court's construction of section i of Article III appears to coincide with
the views of Chief Justice Taney, expressed in a letter of protest to the Secretary
of the Treasury, (1863) 157 U. S. 701; with the opinion of Attorney General
Hoar, (i869) 13 Op. Atty. Gen. i6i; and with the views of Mr. Justice Field in
the Pollock case, (894) 157 U. S. 429, 6o4-6o6, IS Sup. Ct. 673, 698-699. The
decisions in the state courts on similar constitutional provisions are conflicting.
Authorities are collected in (I919) 3r Op. Atty. Gen. 475, and in State ex rel.
Wickham v. Nygaard (1915) I59 Wis. 396, I5O N. W. 513, holding that the Wis-
consin income tax did not diminish the salary of a public officer during his term
of office. Since the decision in the principal case, the acting Attorney General
has ruled that the salaries of federal ,judges appointed after the passage of the
Revenue Act of I918 are subject to the income tax levied by that Act. (i92o)
32 Op. Atty. Gen. 248.
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hibition against a tax on exports.20  A similar rule was announced
as to interstate commerce.21 The Court's differentiation of these cases
is that an income tax laid, not on gross receipts, but on net proceeds
remaining after all expenses were paid and losses adjusted, does not
directly burden-the business, but only indirectly and remotely affects
it. It does not seem clear why an indirect and remote effect is not
permissible in one class of cases while it is in another.
2 2
The effects of the Court's broad holding are serious. Not merely
is a large and growing field of revenue shown to be beyond the reach
of the federal government, but the whole present scheme of federal
income taxation with its surtaxes increasing with the amount of
income, is impracticable. The resulting effects upon business in gen-
eral and upon such especially acute situations as the present lack of
housing cannot be underestimated. Why should one possessing capital
invest in real estate mortgages to enable a would-be householder to
build, when vastly more return may be obtained from a municipal
bond ?23 The whole incentive of this situation is to turn capital from
fields vitally necessary to everyone to fields of public works. Such
works in part at least are of course desirable, but many forms of
public works are non-productive and the greater security involved in
investments of this character has under ordinary conditions made them
sufficiently attractive to investors. To make them still more attractive
is to place an incentive on goVernmental extravagance-at the expense
of productive forms of business, and at the same time the whole
theory that he who has the greater income must share a greater portion
of the burden of government falls to the ground, for he invests in
tax-exempt securities.
24
The outlook for a change in this situation is dark. The only pos-
sible change is by another constitutional amendment, and the prospects
of securing the passage of such an amendment against the opposition
of the states seems slight. The only compensating feature of the
situation is in the notice thus given the government that the field of
income taxation is not limitless and that the burdens of government
must be reduced.
C. E. C.
"Peck & Co. v. Lowe (ig8) 247 U. S. 165, 38 Sup. Ct. 432; cf. (igi8) 27
YALE LAW JOURNAL, io96.
= United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek (1918) 247 U. S. 321, 38 Sup. Ct. 499.
= See Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority (1gI) 32 HAMW. L.
REv. 9o2, 926-928; also 262 Fed. 554.
'Under the present federal income tax a 4/2 per cent tax-free bond yields
as much net income to a person possessing income exceeding $4o,ooo as a taxable
security paying 6.o8 per cent. The rate increases until in the case of persons
with incomes of over $i,oooooo the 4Y per cent tax-free bond is as profitable
as a security yielding 16.67 per cent. Kahn, Two Years of Faulty Taxation
'(920) 14, 15.'Obviously federal securities must be kept tax-free in order t6 compete with
the state and muaicipal securities.
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FOOD CONTROL ACT
Section 4 of the Lever Act, or Food Control Act, of August io,
1917,1 rendered unlawful the sale of necessaries at an unjust and
unreasonable price. Congress failed to provide a penalty for this
offense. Therefore the Circuit Court of Appeals held that charging
an unreasonable price for sugar was no crime under Section 4, as
federal courts have no jurisdiction in criminal cases except where the
punishment is specifically provided for by an Act of Congress.
2 This
is the traditional view as to the criminal jurisdiction of federal courts.
3
The amendment to this Act, of October 22, I919,4 provided that a
fine not exceeding $5,ooo or imprisonment for two years, or both, be
visited upon a violator of this section, excepting from the application
of this statute, however, farmers, dairymen, and stockmen with respect
to products raised on land owned or leased by them, and excepting
collective bargaining of farmers and dairymen through their co6pera-
tive associations. In two decisions of federal district courts on the
constitutionality of this section, as amended, it was held void in that
it denies to the accused the information as to the nature and cause of
the accusation, which is assured to him by the Sixth Amendment. It
was said that a statute creating a crime should be sufficiently definite
so that a man may know whether or not he is committing one without
running the risk of a different interpretation on the part of a jury
which tries him.5 But the majority of the courts in which this ques-
tion has arisen have held the section to be sufficiently definite and it
would seem that this is the preferable view.
6 An extraordinary con-
dition existed at the time of the passage of the Lever Act. Some curb
was necessary upon the rapaciousness of the profiteer. Local condi-
tions were too varied to permit of a set schedule of prices. The estab-
lishment of a maximum percentage of profit would have been too
cumbersome and slow of enforcement. It was thought safe to leave
this question to the jury. "The law is full of instances where a man's
fate depends upon his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subse-
quently estimates it, some matter of degree." These were the words
of Justice Holmes in upholding the constitutionality of the criminal
sections of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in the case of Nash v. United
States.7  In that decision the same objection was made as in the
instant case; that the words, "unduly restrict competition," were so
'Comp. St. U. S. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. igig, sec 3115 1/8 ff.
'Mossew v. United States (1920, C. C. A. 2d) 266 Fed. 18.
'Tennessee v..Davis (1879) 100 U. S. 257.
' 41 Stat. at L., 297.
'Detroit Creamery Co. v. Kinnane (192o, E. D. Mich.) 264 Fed. 845; United
States v. Cohen Grocery Co. (192o, E. D. Mo.) 264 Fed. 21&
' United States v. Russell (102o, E. D. La.) 265 Fed. 414; United States v.
Oglesby Grocery Co. (I92O, N. D. Ga.) 264 Fed. 691,
' (1913) 229 U. S. 373, 377, 33 Sup. Ct. 780, 781.
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indefinite as to constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Those
attacking this section of the Lever Act laid great stress on the case
of International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky.8 But that was a case
under a state -statute making "any combination lawful unless for the
purpose or with the effect of fixing a price that was greater or less
than the real value of the article." And this "real value" was to be
its market value "under fair competition and under normal market
conditions." The court held that this was compelling the corporation
to guess what prices would be in an imaginary world and under penalty
of an indictment, and held the law void. The opinion in the Harvester
Co. case distinguishes the Nash case by saying, "that deals with the
actual, not with an imaginary condition other than the facts." "The
statute may be construed to forbid, in time of war, any departure from
the usual and established scale of charges and prices in time of peace,
which is not justified -by some special circumstance of the commodity
or dealer."9 Thus interpreted, it would seem that the Lever Act cannot
be successfully attacked on the ground of indefiniteness.
Section 4 of the Lever Act has, however, been held unconstitutional
as a violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it exempts from its
operation farmers and others. In the case of United States v. Arm-
strong"0 Judge Anderson of Indiana held that the "due process of
law" clatise was violated because of the arbitrary and unreasonable
classification in exempting farmers and stockmen. These persons
were favored in comparison with the producers of fuel, for example,
whose product was of similar nature and quite as necessary to the
conduct of the war. This presents an interesting problem on which
we may shortly expect to see further litigation.11
SOCIAL WELFARE
A field in which reliable social welfare statistics as to the effect of
legal principles in actual operation would be of inestimable value in
deciding what the law ought to be, is -that of attorney's contingent fee
contracts. The argument from necessity for such contracts is obvious:
that otherwise poor suitors with deserving cases would find it impos-
sible to get their cases into court. Hence the validity of such contracts
8 (r914) 234 U. S. 216, 34 Sup. Ct. 853.
United States v. Oglesby Grocery Co., supra, note 6, at p. 695.
10 (I92o, D. Ind.) 265 Fed. 683.
'The payment of a fine imposed in a criminal case, even if the judgment of
conviction was void, is not a bar to a suit to recover the money. United States v.
Rothenstein (ig", C. C. A. 7th) 187 Fed. 268. Under this rule a fine which had
been paid to the government following a conviction under the original section was
recovered in Mossew v. United States, supra, note 2.
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is usually upheld in this country., Just as obvious is the fact that
there is now afforded unworthy members of the profession an oppor-
tunity availed of all too often for making extortionate and uncon-
scionable agreements and for speculating in weak cases, accompanied,
as such practice usually must be, by the worst forms of solicitation
and touting of business.2  Statistics, if available, as to the number of
meritorious cases saved by contingent fee contracts, the number of
cases decided for defendants instituted under such agreements and
the like would throw much light upon the desirability of the present
legal viewpoint.3 The proper result may well be that it is more desir-
able to provide for the needs of poor litigants in other ways, such as
the legal aid society and similar agencies.' At any rate courts may
well refuse to uphold such contracts when the necessity for them does
not exist or is outweighed by other considerations. Thus the law's
well-known abhorrence of divorce leads to a refusal to enforce con-
tingent fee contracts to procure divorces.5 In Baca v. Padilla (1920,
N. M.) 19o Pac. 73o , -the same principle was applied to an attorney's
contract to assist in the prosecution of a criminal case for a fee
contingent upon the conviction of the accused. There has been con-
siderable question as to the wisdom of allowing private counsel to
assist in public prosecution at all; whether the interest of state and
accused are not better served by having the prosecution entirely in
the hands of a disinterested public official. Most courts have thought
such assistance permissible, however, so long as the actual control of
the prosecution remains with the public prosecutor.8 But a contingent
fee contract under such circumstances must rest upon not one but
two principles of doubtful societal value and the court properly
refused to enforce it.
7
'Cases are collected in 2 Thorhton, Attorneys (914) sec. 421; I Ann. Cas.
299, note. As to the limitations on such agreements in some jurisdictions see
Hadlock v. Brooks (i9oi) 178 Mass. 425, 59 N. E. ioo9, and Thornton, op. cit.,
sec. 388.
=See discussion by J. H. Cohen, The Law, Business or Profession (1915)
205 if., especially 209: "Its general practice is to-day at the root of much of all
the evils in the practice of the law, and sooner or later will be controlled either
by rules of court or by legislation."
" See C. E. Grinnell, NoTEs (1882) 16 Am. L. REv. 240, 242; "the actual effect
of an habitual practice for contingent fees . . . seems to us to be the turning
point of the discussion, so far as its value to the profession is concerned."
' See R. H. Smith, Justice and the Poor (igig) for review of agencies devised
to secure better justice for poor litigants.
'Newman v. Freitas (igoo) 129 Cal. 283, 6z Pac. 9o7; Barngrover v. Petti-
grew (igos) 128 Iowa 533, 304 N. W. 904, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 260, note; 33
L. R. A. (N. S.) io74, note.
IState v. Kent (1895) 4 N. D. 597, 62 N. W. 531. But see Rock v. Ekern
(i916) 162 Wis. 29i, 156 N. W. 197. Cases are collected in Ann. Cas. 1912 Bo
659, note.
' There is little authority. See Rock v. Ekern, supra, with L. R. A. 1916 D,
459, note; Price v. Caperton (1864, Ky.) I Duv. 2o7.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Lobbying contracts are not always illegal; but contracts for the use
of "personal influence" with legislators or executive officers are illegal
and void.1 This is the more certain if payment for such service is
contingent either wholly or in the amount payable, upon success in
the undertaking. In Eads v. Stifel (1920, Mo. App.) 222 S. W. 482,
the appellate court of Missouri held that the same principle applies
in the case of contracts for personal service in political campaigns,
primary and final. The plaintiff's testimony showed that he was prom-
ised $Ioo per week "to use his influence to secure delegates to a
national convention favorable to the candidate supported by the
defendant." The court held this contract to be illegal, both by virtue
of a particular statute defining the crime of bribery, and on grounds
of general public policy.
One has a glowing mental picture of that "innocent female" of
the old melodrama, that sweet heroine of incredible gullibility relent-
lessly pursued 'by a tort-feasing villain of criminal intent. But the
Supreme Court of Iowa" produces an "unmarried" (in the sense of
de-married) 2 Juliet of forty-four, twice led to the altar and twice
divorced, and heroically sustains a charge of seduction against the
villain. He had promised to marry her-they always do-and now,
in five-reel style, enters a plea of "vampire" as a defense. Chivalrous
but unromantic, the law perhaps can not consider the knowledge and
experience of those whom it undertakes to protect.3 So that aside
from its failure as a scenario, the decision seems sound.4
'Trist v. Child (1874, U. S.) 2i Wall. 441'; Providence Tool Co. v. Norris
(1864, U. S.) 2 Wall. 45; Crocker v. United States (I915) 240 U. S. 74, 79,
36 Sup. Ct. 245.
Wiley v. Fleck (192o, Iowa) 178 N. W. 410.
'State v. Eddy (i918) 4o S. D. 39o, 167 N. W. 392.
'State v. Wallace (1916) 79 Ore. 129, 154 Pac. 430a
"People v. Weinstock (1912, City Magistrate's Court, N. Y.) 14o N. Y. Supp.
453, where the subject is ably reviewed. Contra, Jennings v. Commonwealth
(i9O9) io9 Va. 821, 63 S. E. io8o.
